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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of properly is fundamental to our society, probably to any
workable society. Operationally,it is understoodby every child above
the age of three. Intellectually, it is understood by no one.
-D.

Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom
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In the United States, the concept of property exists, not as an abstraction, but as the "yield" of a tension between the individual freedom to own
and use property and the inherent power of the government to regulate for
the public health, safety, and welfare. Unfortunately, the constitutional
framework for the tension between public and private interests in the use of
private property is anything but coherent (what then Justice Rehnquist once
described as "judicial clangor"), leaving most observers, including the
courts, frustrated and confused as to what are property rights. This
jurisprudential environment of uncertainty is debilitating for responsible
public and private resource planning and management,2 as well as for
property owners and developers who are affected by such programs in many
ways.
The environment of uncertainty breeds confusion, polarization, and
conflict. During the last two decades, the "legal defensibility" of land use
regulations has predominated the dialogue of public planning in America to
the exclusion of what planning is most appropriate.3 The public, concerned
about environmental degradation, sprawl, and congestion, has pressed to
expand public control over the private use of property. Property owners,
while accepting the need for public control, have complained of regulatory
abuses and have pressed the courts to rein in government regulations which
have gone too far. The tension found most of its voice in the so-called
"taking issue" where property rights "hawks," or "taking mavens," argued
for just compensation when regulations went "too far." The underlying
objective of the hawks was not, however, to obtain compensation, but rather

1. In his dissent in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, cert. denied,
453 U.S. 922 (1981), Justice Rehnquist wrote:
I agree substantially with the views expressed in the dissenting opinions
of THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE STEVENS and make only these two additional
observations: (1) In a case where city planning commissions and zoning boards
must regularly confront constitutional claims of this sort, it is a genuine
misfortune to have the Court's treatment of the subject be a virtual Tower of
Babel, from which no definitive principles can be clearly drawn; and (2) 1 regret
even more keenly my contribution to this judicial clangor ....
Id. at 569-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2. The term "resource planning and management" is intended to refer to the full range
of planning and management initiatives including land use, air, water, wildlife and other
public efforts to plan for the future and to regulate to achieve that future. Some observers
call this "change management." The term resource planning and management is intended
to avoid the pejorative anti-development implications of the phrase "growth management."
3. The planning and legal literature is literally awash with commentary on the subject
and virtually every planning seminar has at least one program which focuses on "how far can
you go?"

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/6

2

Siemon and Kendig: Judicial Review of Local Government Decisions: "Midnight in the G

1996]

Siemon / Kendig

to create a deterrent against regulatory excesses. If a local government faces
the possibility of paying just compensation far exceeding its boundaries, the
theory was, then the government will be more cautious and may not go as
far as it might otherwise be inclined to go.4 Ultimately, the taking issue
was resolved in favor of compensation. However, the Supreme Court's
holdings in First English Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles,5
Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastalCommission,6 Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal
Council,' and Dolan v. City of Tigard' have ignored the real weakness in
the system, the lack of effective and efficient judicial review. The
possibility of having to pay compensation for property rights does not act
as a deterrent in the absence of meaningful review of government actions.
Simply put, contemporary planning jurisprudence makes the question of
remedy all but moot.
It should be self-evident that the compact between the government and
the governed, on which this nation is founded, depends on the effectiveness
of constitutional adjudication. Rights do not exist in a vacuum and the
history of civil rights in this nation shows beyond peradventure that rights
which cannot be enforced in court are no rights at all. In the land use field,
property rights have become practically non-existent to the extent that, as of
May, 1995, fifteen state legislatures had given up on the courts as the
guardians of property rights, and have enacted laws which address the issue
of property rights by limiting the power of government.9 The culprits in
this sad story are the so-called "ripeness doctrine,"'" whereby justice
delayed is justice denied, and the practical effect of the "fairly debatable
rule." Both of these judicial standards which are applied to local government property regulation have contributed to the lack of effective judicial

4. In his highly influential dissent in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego,
450 U.S. 621 (1981), Justice Brennan observed: "After all, if a policeman must know the

Constitution, then why not a planner? In any event, one may wonder as an empirical matter
whether the threat of just compensation will greatly impede the efforts of planners."
Id. at 661 n.26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5. 482 U.S. 304 (1987), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
6. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
7. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
8. 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994).
9. Jane C. Hayman & Nancy Stuparich, Private Property Rights: Regulating the
Regulators, 70 FLA. B.J. 55 (Jan. 1996).
10. The ripeness doctrine is derived from the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477
U.S. 340 (1986).
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review of such regulation. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon," Justice
Holmes observed that there is a tension between public and private interests
in private property and that there must be limits. Justice Holmes wrote,
"[a]s long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation
and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation
12
must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone."'
The trouble is, limits are meaningful only if they are easily enforceable
in court, the missing ingredient in contemporary planning law. The legal
fiction that local planning and zoning decisions involving individual parcels
of land, in the context of a particular development proposal, are legislative
acts entitled to a presumption of validity, has compounded the problems
with the practical effect of the "fairly debatable rule." Indeed, the "anything
goes,"' 3 fairly debatable rule so badly imbalanced public and private
interests in regard to the use of land that it is practically impossible to
redress even outrageous abuses of the zoning power. 4
Worse still, the lack of a judicial enforcement of constitutional rights
ensures that there is no "incentive" for local governments to do a "good" job
of planning and regulating because it does not matter. Doing a "good" job
is simply not required to win in court; thus, legal defensibility is "all that
matters." The result is that public planning is under funded and does not

11. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
12. ad at 413.
13. The "anything goes" epithet was originally coined by Judge Goldberg of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in response to a series of Equal Protection cases following the
Supreme Court of the United States' opinion in City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297
(1976), in which Judge Goldberg's invalidation of the city of New Orleans' hot dog vendor
regulation was overturned. The Dukes case is a classic illustration of the limited scope of
review available to ensure that local government does not abuse constitutionally protected
rights. After the Supreme Court of the United States overturned Judge Goldberg's decision
for the circuit court, Judge Goldberg commented: "With its holding in Dukes the Supreme
Court has made it clear that in a case such as this, we must apply the test of 'minimum
rationality' and that this test means little more than 'anything goes."' Arceneaux v. Treen,
671 F.2d 128, 136 (5th Cir. 1982) (Goldberg, J., specially concurring) (citing Dukes, 427
U.S. at 305). Further, Judge Goldberg stated: "[t]he Supreme Court chose to uphold this
officially sanctioned wiener cartel, opining that '[t]he city could reasonably decide' that the
exempted vendors 'had themselves become part of the distinctive character and charm that
distinguished the Vieux Carre."' Id. at 136 n.2.
14. A town recently argued, with a straight face, that a police power regulation should
be sustained if the town could establish a "hypothetical" justification for its actions because
it did not matter whether the justification was real or not. See Trial Memorandum of the
Town of Sunnyvale, Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, No. 87-3704-K (Tex. 192d Dist. Ct.,
Nov. 12, 1991).
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have the political support needed to ensure that the growth and development
of our cities is balanced and beneficial. American planning has not lived up
to its capability, not because planners were unable to anticipate the terrible
social and economic cost of mindless sprawl, but because planning was
made irrelevant in a society that takes it cues from its legal institutions. The
courts said "anything goes"; and local governments, which were delegated
the state's police power, took the courts at their word, ignored planning, and
embraced "anything goes," literally and figuratively. Indeed, even though
the zoning enabling acts of most states required that zoning be "in
accordance with a comprehensive plan," few if any communities had
adopted comprehensive plans by the 1970s.
There are, however, three lines of cases, two from the Supreme Court
of Florida, and one from the Supreme Court of the United States which
could, if rationally and coherently applied to the realities of contemporary
resource planning and management, establish a more certain and predictable
environment for planners and developers alike. The first line of cases arises
out of the Supreme Court of Florida's decisions in City of Miami Beach v.
Lachman"5 and Burritt v. Harris.16 The second line of cases is derived
from the same court's more recent landmark holding in Board of County
Commissioners v. Snyder,17 where the court employed a functional analysis
to hold that individual rezoning actions are not legislative acts. The third
line of cases relates to the Supreme Court of the United States' recognition
of a substantive limitation on the police power within the Just Compensation
Clause of the Constitution of the United States, starting with Agins v. City
of Tiburon." Together, these three lines of cases, if rationally and fairly
implemented, offer an alternative solution to the property rights debate,
which would preserve for local governments the power and authority to go
as far as necessary to protect the public health, safety, and welfare, but no
further. This article discusses the law of planning and zoning as it exists
under the auspices of the "fairly debatable rule" and analyzes how the
previously mentioned three lines of cases can be effectively implemented.

15.
16.
17.
18.

71 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1953), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 906 (1955).
172 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1965).
627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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II. SUPREME COURT LINE OF CASES
A.

The Fairly Debatable Rule
[Dieference does not mean abdication.
-Justice Thurgood Marshall 19

In its landmark decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,20
the Supreme Court of the United States validated the concept of zoning as
a proper exercise of the state's police power and established the constitutional standard for the substantive validity of local government planning and
zoning actions.2' The Court stated: "it must be said before the ordinance
can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable, having no substantialrelationto the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare."22 Two years later, the Court reaffirmed that
"a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare" was the
substantive raison d'etre of a valid zoning action:
The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the
general rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use,
is not unlimited, and other questions aside, such restriction cannot be
imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare.23
The application of this standard to particular zoning actions has,
unfortunately, been complicated and obscured in part by two forces-the
legal fiction that a rezoning is a legislative act, and the so-called "fairly
debatable rule." In Euclid, the Court, after establishing the constitutional
standard for determining the substantive validity of a zoning regulation,
noted that: "[i]f the validity of the legislative classification for zoning
purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to
control."2 4 There are very few statements which have been so widely

19. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 14 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
20. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
21. Id. at 395.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (quoting Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Corp., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)) (emphasis added).
24. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
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misunderstood and misapplied.25 Some have construed the fairly debatable
standard to mean that all a local government need do is hold a hearing
where there is a debate to sustain the substantive validity of an action.2 6
Others claim that the fairly debatable rule is an irrebuttable presumption of
validity, requiring that all a local government need do is mouth words of
rationality to sustain even the most extreme regulatory actions.27
In either case, judicial review under the so-called fairly debatable rule
is neither "swift nor just" and too often is little more than a test of whether
the local government staff is smart enough to invoke the correct mantra of
rationality. The "anything goes" character of the fairly debatable rule has
undermined the integrity of planning and zoning and has promoted
increasing polarization and division between the public and private sectors,
ultimately contributing to the erosion of planning and zoning powers in the
guise of property rights legislation. Worse still, the "anything goes"
mentality has created a lack of judicial "incentive" to do a "good" job of
25. As one commentator stated:
Just what does "fairlydebatable" mean? As Justice Frederick Hall of New
Jersey said in the Vickers dissent, it can mean whatever you want it to and really
provides no guide whatever since virtually any action can be considered fairly
debatable. Given typically wide and liberal interpretations of the law, it allows
precious few limitations on the average municipality. If it was not debatable, it
probably would not be in the courts in the first place; at least, certainly the city
thinks it is debatable, at a minimum. Localities are likely too smart in this day
and age to act clearly and openly arbitrarily and unreasonably.
DON ALLENSWORTH, LAND PLANNING LAW 47 (1981) (footnote omitted).
26. As one judge stated in his concurring opinion:
I am not prepared to say, then, that a denial of a zoning application, or
similar governmental permission, can never rise to the level of a substantive-dueprocess claim. Such claims should, however, be limited to the truly irrational-for example, a zoning board's decision made by flipping a coin, certainly
an efficient method of decision making, but one bearing no relationship whatever
to the merits of the pending matter.
Lemke v. Cass County, 846 F.2d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring) (emphasis
omitted).
27. This is the practical import of the court's embrace of the "debate" in Corn v. City
of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369 (1lth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1400 (1994),
stating the now dubious proposition that:
Where... citizens consistently come before their city council in public meetings
on a number of occasions and present their individual, fact-based concerns that
are rationally related to legitimate general welfare concerns, it is not arbitrary
and capricious for a city council to decide without a more formal investigation
that those concerns are valid and that the proposed development should not be
permitted.
Id. at 1387.
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planning and regulating, which has deprived public planning of the funding
and political support needed to ensure that growth and development is wellplanned.
The problematic character of the fairly debatable rule is particularly
perplexing because the supreme courts of both the United States and Florida
have made it clear that the courts have an obligation to ensure that private
property rights are not destroyed by regulatory excesses. Indeed, the
Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Nectow v. City of
Cambridge,8 decided just two years after Euclid, makes it clear that the
Supreme Court did not intend the fairly debatable rule to mean "anything
goes." In Nectow, a property owner challenged a municipal decision to
draw a zoning district boundary along the edge of his property instead of
along the road on which the property fronted. As a result, the property,
located in one comer of an urban block, was zoned differently from the
balance of the block. After a hearing on the merits in front of a master, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held:
If there is to be zoning at all, the dividing line must be drawn somewhere. There cannot be a twilight zone. If residence districts are to
exist, they must be bounded. In the nature of things, the location of the
precise limits of the several districts demands the exercise of judgment
and sagacity. There can be no standard susceptible of mathematical
exactness in its application. Opinions of the wise and good may well
differ as to the place to put the separation between different districts.
Courts cannot set aside the decision of public officers in such a
matter unless compelled to the conclusion that it has no foundation in
reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no
substantial relation to the public health, the public morals, the public
safety, or the public welfare in its proper sense. These considerations
cannot be weighed with exactness. That they demand the placing of the
boundary of a zone one hundred feet one way or the other in land
having similar material features would be hard to say as [a] matter of
law.
The case at bar is close to the line. But we do not feel justified in
holding that the zoning line established is whimsical, without foundation
in reason. In our opinion it is not violative of the rights secured to the

28. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/6

8

Siemon and Kendig: Judicial Review of Local Government Decisions: "Midnight in the G

1996]

Siemon / Kendig

plaintiff by the Constitution, either of this commonwealth or by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.29
The Supreme Court of the United States, the source of the "fairly
debatable rule," reversed and invalidated the municipal zoning action
making it clear that the Court did not intend an "anything goes" standard for
judicial review of local zoning decisions." First, the Court paid deference
to the lower court's decision and affirmed the constitutional standard
established in Euclid:
We quite agree with the opinion expressed below that a court
should not set aside the determination of public officers in such a matter
unless it is clear that their action "has no foundation in reason and is a
mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial
relation to the public health, the public morals, the public safety or the
public welfare in its proper sense."31
Then the Court carefully, and in detail, reviewed what it saw as the
controlling facts of the case:
An inspection of a plat of the city upon which the zoning districts
are outlined, taken in connection with the master's findings, shows with
reasonable certainty that the inclusion of the locus in question is not
indispensable to the general plan. The boundary line of the residential
district before reaching the locus runs for some distance along the
streets, and to exclude the locus from the residential district requires
only that such line shall be continued 100 feet further along Henry
[S]treet and thence south along Brookline [S]treet. There does not
appear to be any reason why this should not be done. Nevertheless, if
that were all, we should not be warranted in substituting our judgment
for that of the zoning authorities primarily32charged with the duty and
responsibility of determining the question.

29. City of Cambridge v. Nectow, 157 N.E. 618, 620 (Mass. 1927), rev'd, 277 U.S. 183
(1928).
30. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 189.
31. Id. at 187-88 (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 365, 395
(1926)).
32. Id. at 188 (quoting Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927)). The
master's findings were:
that no practical use can be made of the land in question for residential purposes,
because among other reasons herein related, there would not be adequate return
on the amount of any investment for the development of the property ....I am
satisfied that the districting of the plaintiff's land in a residence district would not
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Finally, the Court applied the substantial relationship test and found the
challenged actions wanting:
The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the
general rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use,
is not unlimited, and other questions aside, such restrictions cannot be
imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare. Here, the express findings of the
master, already quoted, confirmed by the court below, is that the health,
safety, convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants of the part of
the city affected will not be promoted by the disposition made by the
ordinance of the locus in question. This finding of the master, after a
hearing and an inspection of the entire area affected, supported, as we
think it is, by other findings of fact, is determinative of the case. That
the invasion of the property of plaintiff in error was serious and highly
injurious is clearly established; and, since a necessary basis for the
support of that invasion is wanting, the action of the zoning authorities
comes within the ban of the Fourteenth Amendment and cannot be
sustained.33
In the context of the state court decision, it is plain that Justice
Sutherland, the author of both the Nectow and Euclid decisions, did not
intend the fairly debatable rule to mean "anything goes."

B.

The "Substantially Advances" Rule
History would be a wonderful thing-if it were only true.
-Leo

Tolstoy

In Agins v. City of Tiburon34 the Supreme Court of the United States
observed that:

The application of a general zoning law to particularproperty effects
a taking if the ordinancedoes not substantiallyadvance legitimate state

promote the health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants of
that part of the defendant City, taking into account the natural development
thereof and the character of the district and the resulting benefit to accrue to the
whole City and I so find.
Nectow, 277 U.S. at 187.
33. Il at 188-89 (citations omitted).
34. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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interests ...or denies an owner economically viable use of his land..
. The determination that governmental action constitutes a taking is,
in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather than a single
owner, must
bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public
35
interest.
On its face, the Court's statement suggested the existence of a substantive
limitation on the police power. The suggestion was either ignored,
dismissed as a misnomic reference to the due process requirement that a
regulation bear some substantial relationship to the public health, safety, and
welfare, or explained as a contemporary use of the word "taking" as a
metaphor for invalidity.36 Nectow was, after all, a substantive due process
case, not a taking case.
In 1986, however, the Court restated in Agins the proposition first
recognized in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,37 and then
in Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission.3" Nollan involved more than
a recitation of established principle because it was clear that the Court was
not referring to a due process requirement when it spoke of a "failure to
substantially advance" a violation of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Scalia
wrote:
Contrary to Justice BRENNAN's claim, our opinions do not establish
that these standards are the same as those applied to due process or
equal protection claims. To the contrary, our verbal formulations in the
takings field have generally been quite different. We have required that
the regulation "substantially advance" the "legitimate state interest"
sought to be achieved, not that "the State 'could rationally have
decided' that the measure adopted might achieve the State's objective.)

39

35. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
36. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker & Michael M. Berger, A Plea to Allow the Federal
Courts to Clarify the Law of Regulatory Takings, 42 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Jan.

1990, at 3, 5 (lamenting the Supreme Court's ad hoc, fact-based taking decisions, and their
ripeness doctrine, as preventing the development of a clear body of constitutional law for the
states to follow).
37. 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987). "We have held that land use regulation can effect a
taking if it 'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.... or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land."' Id.(quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
38. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
39. Id. at 834 n.3 (citations omitted).
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Further, any doubt as to whether the Supreme Court reads the Just
Compensation Clause to be a substantive limitation on exercises of the
police power (that is, to be valid, a regulation must substantially advance a
legitimate public purpose) was resolved in the Court's decision in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council.0 The Court stated: "As we have said on
numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use
regulation 'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies
an owner economically viable use of his land."''4 Additional confirmation
of the vitality of the substantially advances standard is found in A.A.
Profiles, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale,42 which held that an exercise of
the police power was a taking in violation of the just compensation clause
because it failed to "substantially advance a legitimate public purpose. 43
The court went on to state:
The Supreme Court has recognized that a taking may occur where
a governmental entity exercises its power of eminent domain through
formal condemnation proceedings .... or where a governmental entity
exercises its police power through regulation which restricts the use of
property.... In the latter situation the government regulation must
"substantially advance" a "legitimate state interest" or deprive an
owner of an economically viable use of the land.'
The emergence of a Fifth Amendment substantive limitation on the
police power may well be the most significant event in contemporary
planning law. Indeed, a constitutional requirement that a regulatory action
actually advance (substantially or otherwise) a legitimate public purpose
implicates a scope of judicial review far more exacting than either the
Florida "bounds of necessity" standard, or the rational justification standard
discussed above, and could relegate substantive due process challenges to
the annals of history.
Undoubtedly, local governments will take the position that the Supreme
Court of the United States does not mean what it says and that a "substantially advances" standard would destroy growth management as we know it.
If the "substantially advances" requirement, under the taking clause,
becomes the nominal vehicle for challenges to local zoning decisions,
growth management will change dramatically. But that does not mean that
40. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
41.
42.
43.
44.

Md at 1016 (citing Agins, 447 U.S. at 260) (citations omitted) (first emphasis added).
850 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989).
Id. at 1486.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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local governments will be helpless to ensure that growth and development
"proceeds in an orderly manner." 45 To the contrary, a more exacting
standard of review would motivate local governments to do a better job of
planning, to go beyond the minimums that to a large extent have defined the
quality and character of planning in Florida.
iII. THE MIAMI BEACH AND BURRITT LINE OF CASES

That judicial deference does not mean abdication is also clear from the
precedents of the Supreme Court of Florida. In one of its earliest zoning
cases, the Supreme Court of Florida, in City of Miami Beach v. Lachman,6

made it clear that judicial review was more than a pro forma exercise. The
court held that:
While Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Company approved the
zoning and segregation of private property into residential, business, and
industrial districts, it was as equally emphatic that ifsuch zoning did not
have some substantialrelationto the public health, safety, morals, and
general welfare, it would be held to be arbitrary,unreasonable, and
unconstitutional. There is no warrant whatever in this, or any other,
case to support the thesis that zoning boards are infallible and that any
kind of zoning proposition [that] they promulgate will be upheld. In
other words, zoning boards are in the same category as all other
administrative boards. Their ordinances and regulationswill be given
serious considerationand theirjudgments great weight, but where it is
conclusively shown that they deprive one of his property without due
process or otherwise infringe on State or Federal constitutional
guarantees unreasonably,such ordinances and regulations cannot be
said to be reasonably debatable and will be stricken down.
We understand the doctrine of Marbury v. Madison to be applic-

able. "When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested
in the legislature by the constitution, it is the duty of the courts to
declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it
without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to
maintain the constitution as the fundamental law of the state is
imperative and unceasing" and applies as imperatively when properly

45. Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
46. 71 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1953), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 906 (1955).
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invoked against a zoning ordinance as it does against an act of the
legislature.47

There is, in fact, a substantial body of law that suggests that the
standard of review in Florida has been and is more exacting than the
"anything goes" deferential, fairly debatable standard.48 While the fairly
debatable rule is frequently invoked by the Florida courts, sometimes in its
"anything goes" garb, there is a clear line of cases which invokes a very
different, more rigorous standard.
In Burritt v. Harris,49 the Supreme Court of Florida expanded on
Lachman and held that:
The constitutional right of the owner of property to make legitimate
use of his lands may not be curtailed by unreasonable restrictions under
the guise of police power. The owner will not be requiredto sacrifice
his rights absent a substantial need for restrictions in the interest of
public health, morals, safety or welfare. If the zoning restriction
exceeds the bounds of necessity . . . they must be stricken as an
unconstitutionalinvasion of property rights.5"

The difference between the standard enunciated in Burritt and the
"anything goes" standard of the fairly debatable mantra is palpable. A plain
reading of the court's holding makes it clear that when property rights are
affected, the standard of justifiable regulation is one of necessity, not choice,
which is the sine qua non of the constitutional imperative for a substantial
relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare. It would be difficult
for the court to have been more explicit when it stated: "[i]f the zoning
restriction exceeds the bounds of necessity ...

they must be stricken as an

unconstitutional invasion of property rights."'"
On its face, Burritt stands for the proposition in Florida that the
Supreme Court of the United States' statement, "bears some substantial
47. Id. at 150 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This case involved a suit by 10
property owners based on the refusal of the City of Miami Beach to rezone their ocean front
property to allow multifamily homes. The court ultimately found the ordinance "fairly
debatable" and ruled in favor of the City. Id. at 153.
48. See Davis v. Sails, 318 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
49. 172 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1965).
50. Id. at 823 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Burritt involved a denial of a
rezoning request by a property owner whose property was zoned residential, but due to its
proximity to an airport, was incontrovertibly unsuitable for residential use. The court found
that the county failed to show that its denial was fairly debatable. Id.
51. Id.
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relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare," means that an "owner
will not be required to sacrifice his rights absent a substantial need for
restrictions in the interest of the public health, morals, safety or welfare." 2
Some commentators have tried to avoid the holding of Burrittv. Harrisby
claiming that the holding was overruled in City of St. Petersburgv. Aikin."3
However, it is clear that Aikin did not affect the substantive holding in
Burritt.
The issue in Aikin was simply whether the burden was "upon the
zoning authority to prove the reasonableness and necessity of a zoning
classification" or "upon the petitioner [property owner] to show that the
application for rezoning raised a matter which was not a fairly debatable
issue before the legislative authority." 4 The court held:
We conclude that the opinion last above cited [that the burden is
on the petitioner] correctly states the procedural point, and that the
opinion of this Court in Burritt v. Harris has been erroneously construed
as creating "an innovation in the zoning law of Florida." Other recent
cases recognize no such departure, and continue to apply the well
established body of law in this field55
Any doubt that the Aikin court was receding from its "necessity" holding in
Burritt is disposed of by the court's citation of Smith v. City of Miami
Beach.56 There, the court, far from disavowing the Burritt court's necessity holding, noted:
It is fundamental that one may not be deprived of his property
without due process of law, but is also well established that he may be
restricted in the use of it when that is necessary to the common good.
So in this case we must weigh against the public weal plaintiffs rights
to enjoy unhampered property acquired since the enactment of the

52. Id at 823 (citing Tollius v. City of Miami, 96 So. 2d 122, 125 (Fla. 1957)).
53. 217 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1968).
54. Id.at 316 (footnotes omitted).
55. Id.(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). By this holding, the Supreme Court has
created an "innovation in the zoning law of Florida," see id, by casting on the zoning
authority the burden of establishing by a preponderance of evidence that the zoning
restrictions under attack "bear[] substantially on the public health, morals, safety or welfare
of the community," Burritt v. Harris, 172 So. 2d 820, 822 (Fla. 1965), if the ordinance is to
be sustained. See Lawley v. Town of Golfview, 174 So. 2d 767, 770 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App.
1965). But see Aiken, 217 So. 2d at 316 (disclaiming that the Burrittdecision created an
"innovation on the zoning law of Florida").
56. 213 So. 2d 281 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
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ordinance. Such restrictions must find their basis in the safety, health,
morals or general welfare of the community."
Burritt is not alone. In fact, outside of the zoning area, there has never
been any question in Florida that property rights are well-protected from
overzealous regulation. For example, in State v. Leone,5" decided just five
years before Burritt, the Supreme Court of Florida held that: "While it is
true that the constitutional guarantee of individual rights does not prevent
the exercise of the police power so as to interfere with such rights, it does
operate to limit the exercise of that power." 9 The court further stated that:
[T]he police power may be used only against those individual rights
which are reasonably related to the accomplishment of the desired end
which will serve the public interest. This means that the interference
with or sacrifice of the private rights must be necessary, i.e. must be
essential, to the reasonable accomplishment of the desired goal. Such
interference or sacrifice of private rights can never be justified nor
sanctioned merely to make it more convenient or easier for the State to
achieve the desired end. This is so because one, if not the principal,
reason for the existence of a democratic form of government is to
guarantee to the individual freedom of action in those pursuits which do
not harm his neighbors. If there is a choice of ways in which government can reasonably attaina valid goal necessary to the public interest,
it must elect that course which will infringe the least on the rights of the
individual.6
Further, contrary to the fairly debatable mantra mavens, the court's
narrow view of the balance between public and private rights is not
"ancient" law, but rather, good law. As the Supreme Court of Florida stated
in In re Foifeiture of 1969 Piper Navajo:6'
In this case the method chosen by the legislature . . . is not
sufficiently narrowly tailored to the objective ... to survive constitutional scrutiny. This is particularly so because property rights are
protected by a number of provisions in the Florida Constitution. Article
I, section 2 provides that "[a]ll natural persons are equal before the law
and have inalienable rights, among which are the right... to acquire,

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id at 283-84 (emphasis added).
118 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 1960).
IM at 784 (emphasis added).
lia at 784-85.
592 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1992).
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possess and protect property . . ." Article I, section 9 provides that
"[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law ... ." Article I, section 23 provides that "[e]very
natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into his private life . ... " As we have previously noted,
"[tihese property rights are woven into the fabric of Florida history."
The main thrust of these protections is that, so long as the public
welfare is protected, every person in Florida enjoys the right to possess
property free from unreasonable government interference.62

Nor can these clear precedents be dismissed by suggesting that the property
rights principles in cases like Leone (regulation of drug stores) and Piper
Navajo (forfeiture) have no application in the planning and zoning arena.
Property is property. Nowhere in the federal or state constitutions is there
a footnote that diminishes the fundamental character of real property or its
use.

What this all means is that the fairly debatable rule is nothing more
than a jurisprudentialrule of procedure by which the courts judge the
evidence in a substantive due process case to determine whether a challenged action bears some substantial relationship to the public health, safety,
and welfare.63 Under this regime, a plaintiff has an "extraordinary burden
of proof,"' not because it is hard for a plaintiff to win, but because the
burden is on the plaintiff to initially prove a negative; to succeed, the
plaintiff must show that the regulation does not bear a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare. It is always difficult to prove
a negative; in some cases, however, it is possible.65 In the absence of a

62. Id at 236 (quoting Shriners Hosp. v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 67 (Fla. 1990))
(emphasis added).
63. It is important to keep in mind that Euclid was a facial challenge and that the
Court's homily to legislative deference was made in that context. Given the Court's holding
in Nectow, an "as applied" case just two years later, it is surely open to question as to
whether the fairly debatable rule should have ever been employed in an "as applied"
challenge regardless of the legal fiction that rezonings were legislative acts.
64. "One who assails zoning legislation has an extraordinary burden of proving that a
municipal enactment is invalid." S.A. Healy Co. v. Town of Highland Beach, 355 So. 2d
813, 815 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); see also City of Miami Beach v. Weisen, 86 So. 2d
442 (Fla. 1956); Dade County v. Beauchamp, 348 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977),
cert. denied,355 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1978); Neubauer v. Town of Surfside, 181 So. 2d 707 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 192 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1966).
65. For example, a local government's decision to designate a parcel of land as a rural
services area on fiscal grounds could be shown to not bear the requisite relationship to the
public health, safety, and welfare where a plaintiff demonstrates that all required urban
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prima facie showing of invalidity, a court has an obligation to sustain the
governmental action. However, once the plaintiff makes a prima facie
showing, the burden should shift to the local government to demonstrate that
the challenged actions do in fact bear a substantial relationship to the public
health, safety, and welfare. If after hearing the local government's evidence,
the court finds that the evidence is such that reasonable men could arrive at
different conclusions, i.e., the record is not determinative and admits to more
than one conclusion, then the fairly debatable rule dictates that the court
should favor the local government.66 On the other hand, if the manifest
weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff or the defendant, then the fairly
debatable rule has no application, and the court should rule according to its
determination.
IV. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS V. SNYDER
A.

Zoning as a Legislative Act

As indicated above, one of the more unfortunate elements in zoning
law has been the legal fiction, apparently derived from Euclid, that zoning
constitutes a legislative act and is therefore entitled to a presumption of
validity. In truth, rezoning which involves an individual parcel of land and
a particular plan of development is not an exercise of legislative power.
Nevertheless, until 1972, courts throughout the United States treated
individual rezonings as if they were an exercise of legislative power at the
highest level, establishing public policies of general application entitled to
abject judicial deference.
Prior to the Civil War, local land use controls were limited in nature
and generally related to fire and building standards. 67 Late in the Nineteenth century, local government concern about the compatibility of land
uses began to sharpen and expand. 68 By 1920, local governments were

services are already available to serve the property.
66. This aspect of the fairly debatable rule is not easy to understand. Traditionally,
ambiguities of every kind between the government and the governed are resolved in favor
of the governed in respect for the principle of reserved powers.
67. See Dainese v. Cooke, 91 U.S. 580 (1875); City of Buffalo v. Chadeayne, 7 N.Y.S.
501 (Sup. Ct. 1889), af'd, 31 N.E. 443 (N.Y. 1892).
68. Most early regulations focused on excluding nuisances and particularly noxious uses
from residential neighborhoods.
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enacting zoning ordinances directed at excluding anything and everything
likely to be an undesirable use. 69 As one commentator notes:
[U]rban America was in something of a crisis in the early 1920's. Like
a patient who could endure his fever until he suddenly learned that there
was now a new remedy for it and who was then impatient to be cured,
urban America was now sure that it would perish if it did not have
zoning ....

Zoning was the heaven-sent nostrum for sick cities, the

wonder drug of the planners, the balm sought by lending institutions
and householders alike. City after city worked itself into a state of
acute apprehension until it could adopt a zoning ordinance. 7

The validity of zoning, however, no matter how popular, was not
immediately apparent to some courts. For example, the Supreme Court of
Texas announced:
The ordinance is clearly not a regulation for the protection of the
public health or the public safety. It is idle to talk about the lawful
business of an ordinary retail store threatening the public health or
endangeringthe public safety. It is equally idle in our opinion to speak
of its impairing the public comfort or as being injurious to the public
welfare of a community."

69. See generally Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 413-14 (1915) (upholding a
prohibition on manufacture of bricks in select districts in the city of Los Angeles in spite of
fact that use began prior to time that property was annexed into city and prior to adoption
of regulation, and despite fact that manufacture of bricks was physically connected to
particular property due to presence of specific clay and that relocation of clay would make
manufacture of bricks fiscally prohibitive); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176-77
(1915) (upholding prohibition of livery stables; and finding that although livery stables are
not nuisances per se, in particular circumstances and particular localities they may be deemed
nuisances in fact and in law, limited only by condition that such police power not be used
arbitrarily or discriminatorily).
70. Charles L. Siemon, The Paradoxof "In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan"
andPostHoc Rationalizations: The Needfor Efficient and Effective JudicialReview of Land
Use Regulations, 16 STETSON L. REv. 607, 608 (1987) (citations omitted).

71. Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 516 (rex. 1921) (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court of Kansas similarly held:
Under the welfare provision of the statute, a city may exercise broad police power
in protecting the public health, safety, and comfort, but to prohibit an owner of
property from using it for ordinary business purposes, or for any use not in itself
a nuisance, where there is no express legislative authority, is not within municipal
power.
Julian v. Golden Rule Oil Co., 212 P. 884, 885 (Kan. 1923).
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To other courts, such as the Supreme Court of Illinois, the logic of
zoning was inescapable:
The state imposes restraints upon individual conduct. Likewise its
interests justify restraints upon the uses to which private property may
be devoted. By the protection of individual rights the state is not
deprived of the power to protect itself or to promote the general
welfare. Uses of private property detrimental to the community's
welfare may be regulated or even prohibited. The harmless may
sometimes be brought within the regulation or prohibition in order to
abate or destroy the harmful. The segregation of industries, commercial
pursuits, and dwellings to particular districts in a city, when exercised
reasonably, may bear a rational relation to the health, morals, safety,
and general welfare of the community. The establishment of such
districts or zones may, among other things, prevent congestion of
population, secure quiet residence districts, expedite local transportation,
and facilitate the suppression of disorder, the extinguishment of fires,
and the enforcement of traffic and sanitary regulations. The danger of
fire and the risk of contagion are often lessened by the exclusion of
stores and factories from areas devoted to residences, and, in consequence, the safety and health of the community may be promoted.
These objects, among others, are attained by the exercise of the police
power.72

In 1926, the Supreme Court of the United States resolved the validity
of zoning in favor of rezoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.73

72. City of Aurora v. Bums, 149 N.E. 784, 788 (ill. 1925) (citation omitted). The court
cited with favor a host of pro-zoning decisions from around the country. Id.; see Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 234 P. 388 (Cal. 1925),
aft'd, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Miller v. Board of Public Works, 234 P. 381 (Cal. 1925); Brown
v. City of Los Angeles, 192 P. 716 (Cal. 1920); City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co.,
184 N.W. 823 (Iowa 1921); West v. City of Wichita, 234 P. 978 (Kan. 1925); Ware v. City
of Wichita, 214 P. 99 (Kan. 1923); State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 4:40
(La. 1923); Bamel v. Building Comm'r, 145 N.E. 272 (Mass. 1924); Brett v. Building
Comm'r, 145 N.E. 269 (Mass. 1924); Spector v. Building Inspector, 145 N.E. 265 (Mass.
1924); Building Inspector v. Stocklosa, 145 N.E. 262 (Mass. 1924); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 127 N.E. 525 (Mass. 1920); State v. Houghton, 204 N.W. 569 (Minn. 1925), affd,
273 U.S. 671 (1927); In re Cherry, 193 N.Y.S. 57 (App. Div.), aff'd, 138 N.E. 465 (N.Y.
1922); Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 128 N.E. 209 (N.Y. 1920); Pritz v.
Messer, 149 N.E. 30 (Ohio 1925); Salt Lake City v. Western Foundry & Store Repair Works,
187 P. 829 (Utah 1920); Holzbauer v. Ritter, 198 N.W. 852 (Wis. 1924); State ex reL Carter,
196 N.W. 451 (Wis. 1923).
73. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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In Euclid, a property owner challenged a zoning ordinance, on its face, on
the grounds that the ordinance violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and similar provisions of the Constitution of the State of
Ohio.74 The issue, from the landowner's perspective, was not the authority
of the Village to regulate the use of land,7" but the inherent "arbitrariness"
of the regulations at issue. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff,
but the Supreme Court reversed.76 The Court held:
We believe it, however, to be the law that these powers must be
reasonably exercised, and that a municipality may not, under the guise
of the police power, arbitrarily divert property from its appropriate and
most economical uses, or diminish its value, by imposing restrictions
which have no other basis than the momentary taste of public authorities. Nor can police regulations be used to effect the arbitrary desire to
have a municipality resist the operation of economic laws and remain
rural, exclusive and aesthetic, when its land is needed to be otherwise
developed by that larger public good and public welfare, which takes
into consideration the extent to which the prosperity of the country
depends upon the economic development of its business and industrial
enterprises.'
On its face, the Euclid Court's holding-coming as it did in a facial
challenge to zoning-was consistent with established balance of powers
principles." Unfortunately, two years later, the same court appeared to

74. Id. at 384. The plaintiff requested an injunction restraining the Village from
enforcing the ordinance and from attempting to impose any of the ordinance restrictions on
the subject property. Id.
75. Indeed, counsel for the landowner stated in his argument:
That municipalities have power to regulate the height of buildings, area of
occupation ...

and density of use, in the interest of the public safety, health,

morals, and welfare, are propositions long since established; that a rational use
of this power may be made by dividing a municipality into districts or zones, and
varying the requirements according to the characteristics of the districts, is, of
course, equally well established.
Id. at 373.
76. Id at 397.
77. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 373-74.
78. See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1953), appeal
dismissed, 348 U.S. 906 (1955) (citations omitted) (describing the doctrine of Marbury v.
Madison as: "When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the
legislature by the constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional
because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office").
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invoke the same standard of review in an "as applied" challenge.79 In so
doing, the Euclid/Nectow Court emasculated planning as a logical and
rational predicate to land use regulation, and in the bargain exalted what
noted zoning expert Richard F. Babcock would describe forty years later as
"trial by neighborism."'s That was so because the legal fiction on which
the Euclid/Nectow court relied-that zoning was a legislative act entitled to
judicial deference-distanced zoning from rational thought (planning) and
merit-based decision making.
It is not clear how the legal fiction that zoning was a legislative act
came into being. However, there can be no doubt that the Supreme Court's
prescription for deference in the context of a facial challenge to a zoning
ordinance, which was established in Euclid, was somehow transmogrified
into the proposition that zoning is a legislative power and individual
rezonings are legislative acts. This transmogrification is particularly
mysterious because the Supreme Court itself, in Nectow, clearly went
beyond abject deference when it invalidated zoning as applied to a particular
parcel of land. s"
Once recognized as a legislative act, zoning was freed from the due
process strictures of fundamental fairness and was subject to great deference
in the event that a property owner was so bold as to question a local
government zoning decision. In the 1950s and 60s, many commentators
pointed to the legislative act fiction as the key problem with zoning
jurisprudence and argued that the fiction should be abandoned. One
commentator noted:
The freedom from accountability of the municipal governing body may
be tolerable in those cases where the legislature is engaged in legislating
but it makes no sense where the legislature is dispensing or refusing to
dispense special grants. When the local legislature acts to pass general
laws applicable generally it is performing its traditional role and it is
entitled to be free from those strictures we place upon an agency that
is charged with granting or denying special privileges to particular
persons. When the municipal legislature crosses over into the role of
hearing and passing on individual petitions in adversary proceedings it
should be required to meet the same procedural standards we expect
from a traditional administrative agency.82
79. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
80. See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 141 (1966).
81. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188-89 (holding residential use classification invalid as applied
to a portion of a large tract which was unsuitable for residential development).
82. BABCOCK, supra note 80, at 158.
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B. Zoning Reform
In 1975, the Supreme Court of Oregon decided Baker v. City of
Milwaukie"3 and set in motion a "movement" that, at least while it had
breath, invited substantial and meaningful zoning reform. In Baker, the
court accepted the Haar/Babcock planning-regulation construct, 4 which
accords legal significance to the comprehensive plan as an instrument of
public policy." Zoning without the predicate of a plan lacked coherence. 6 In this regard, Baker was no more significant than Udell v.
Haas87 and other "comprehensive plan" cases of the times. However,
Baker turned out to be notable because the logical extension of the
comprehensive plan theorem was that if planning is a legal prerequisite to
zoning-the establishment of official policy-then zoning in accordance with
the plan was nothing more than an implementation tool and not an exercise
of policy-making power.
C. Zoning as a Quasi-JudicialAct
The 1973 decision of the Supreme Court of Oregon in Fasanov. Board
of County Commissioners8 8 was a true landmark decision which pierced
through the fiction that rezonings were legislative acts.89 Eventually,

83. 533 P.2d 772 (Or. 1975).
84. See Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive 1lan, 68 HARv. L. REV.
1154, 1175 (1955).
85. Baker, 533 P.2d at 778.

86. Haar, supra note 84, at 1175.
87. 235 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1968). "Rather, the comprehensive plan is the essence of
zoning. Without it, there can be no rational allocation of land use. It is the insurance that
the public welfare is being served and that zoning does not become nothing more than just
a Gallup poll." Id. at 900-01.
88. 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973), disapprovedby Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722
(Or. 1980). See discussion infra note 98.
89. The quasi-judicial approach to rezonings was actually embraced earlier, in the 1972
Supreme Court of Washington decision in Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 502 P.2d 327 (Wash.
1972). In Fleming, the court stated:
Generally, when a municipal legislative body enacts a comprehensive plan
and zoning code it acts in a policy making capacity. But in amending a zoning
code, or reclassifying land thereunder, the same body, in effect, makes an
adjudication betweeh the rights sought by the proponents and those claimed by
the opponents of the zoning change. The parties whose interests are affected are
readily identifiable. Although important questions of public policy may permeate
a zoning amendment, the decision has a far greater impact on one group of
citizens than on the public generally.
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between ten and fifteen states embraced the Fasano rule90 before events
and time overtook the idea and reversed the tide of reform. The issue in
Fasano was the role of the courts in zoning cases. Building on the planning
construct of Baker, the Fasano court dismissed the fiction of zoning as an
exercise of legislative power. The court stated:
At this juncture we feel we would be ignoring reality to rigidly
view all zoning decisions by local governing bodies as legislative acts
to be accorded a full presumption of validity and shielded from less
than constitutional scrutiny by the theory of separation of powers.
Local and small decision groups are simply not the equivalent in all
respects of state and national legislatures. There is growing judicial
recognition of this fact of life:
It is not a part of the legislative function to grant permits,
make special exceptions, or decide particular cases. Such
activities are not legislative but administrative, quasi-judicial,
or judicial in character. To place them in the hands of

Id. at 331; see Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 542 P.2d 371, 373-74 (Colo. 1975) (following
Fleming). Other courts have also classified rezoning as quasi-judicial, but have not directly
addressed the issue. See, e.g., Kelley v. John, 75 N.W.2d 713 (Neb. 1956) (making zoning
from changes from residential to business use an administrative act not subject to
referendum); City of Sand Springs v. Colliver, 434 P.2d 186 (Okla. 1967) (affirming
mandatory injunction requiring approval of application to change zoning); Bird v. Sorenson,
394 P.2d 808 (Utah 1964) (upholding change in zoning from residential to commercial as
administrative act not subject to referendum).
The Fasano decision was also influenced by a student comment which had appeared
in the Ohio State Law Journal. See Michael S. Holman, Zoning Amendments--The Product
of Judicialor Quasi-JudicialAction, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130 (1972).

90. Margolis v. District Court, 638 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1981); Cooper v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 614 P.2d 947 (Idaho 1980); Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130 (Kan.
1978); Dufau v. Parish of Jefferson, 200 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967) (establishing
a "change of mistake" rule for evaluating zoning decisions, but was not uniformly followed);
Northwest Merchants Terminal v. O'Rourke, 60 A.2d 743 (Md. 1948) (following changemistake rule for rezoning which suggests stricter standard than traditional "fairly debatable"
rule); State ex rel. McNary v. Hais, 670 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); Lowe v. City of
Missoula, 525 P.2d 551 (Mont. 1974), overruled sub nom. Greens at Fort Missoula v. City
of Missoula, 897 P.2d 1078 (Mont. 1995); Winslow v. Town of Holderess Planning Bd.,
480 A.2d 114 (N.H. 1984); Cherney v. Matawan Borough Zoning Bd., 534 A.2d 41 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Young Men & Women's Hebrew Ass'n v. Borough Council, 240
A.2d 469, 429 (Pa. 1968); Chioffi v. Winooski Zoning Bd., 556 A.2d 103 (Vt. 1989);
Kentview Properties, Inc. v. City of Kent, 795 P.2d 732 (Wash. App. 1990); Kaufman v.
Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 298 S.E.2d 148 (W. Va. 1982); Holding's Little Am. v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 670 P.2d 699 (Wyo. 1983) (following Fasano in spirit if not explicitly).
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legislative bodies, whose acts as such are not judicially
reviewable, is to open the door completely to arbitrary
government.9

Importantly, the Fasano court explicitly recognized the distinction
between legislative acts to establish policy and the application of established
policy to specific circumstances. The court noted:
Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific
piece of property are usually an exercise of legislative authority, are
subject to limited review, and may only be attacked upon constitutional
grounds for an arbitrary abuse of authority. On the other hand, a
determination whether the permissible use of a specific piece of
property should be changed is usually an exercise of judicial authority
and its propriety is subject to an altogetherdifferent test ....
"Basically, this test involves the determination of whether
action produces a general rule or policy which is applicable
to an open class of individuals, interest, or situations, or
whether it entails the application of a general rule or policy
to specific individuals, interests, or situations. If the former
determination is satisfied, there is legislative action; 92if the
latter determination is satisfied, the action is judicial."
According to the Fasanocourt, only the former act should be accorded
a presumption of validity where the burden is on the party challenging the
action of the legislative body to establish the invalidity of the action.93 On
the other hand, if the zoning was not legislative, then the proceedings should
be attended by the rudiments of procedure and be subject to a more
searching review by the courts. The court stated:
Because the action of the commission in this instance is an
exercise of judicial authority, the burden of proof should be placed, as
is usual in judicial proceedings, upon the one seeking change. The
more drastic the change, the greater will be the burden of showing that
it is in conformance with the comprehensive plan as implemented by the
ordinance, that there is a public need for the kind of change in question,

91. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 26 (quoting Ward v. Village of Skokie, 186 N.E.2d 529, 533
(Ill. 1962) (Klingbiel, J., specially concurring)). Richard Babcock, of course, takes full credit
for having spread the gospel; credit that is, in fact, due.
92. Id at 26-27 (quoting Holman, supra note 89, at 137) (emphasis added).
93. Id at 29.
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and that the need is best met by the proposal under consideration. As
the degree of change increases, the burden of showing that the potential
impact upon the area in question was carefully considered and weighed
will also increase.94
The principal thrust of the Fasano opinion was to recharacterize the
nature of a rezoning decision and to redefine the scope and character of
judicial review of such decisions. However, implicit in the court's decision
that land use decisions involving individual parcels of land were "judicial"
in character was a requirement for due process. This can be gleaned from
the court's statement that:
With future cases in mind, it is appropriate to add some brief remarks
on questions of procedure. Parties at the hearing before the county
governing body are entitled to an opportunity to be heard, to an
opportunity to present and rebut evidence, to a tribunal which is
impartial in the matter-i.e., having had no pre-hearing or ex parte
contacts concerning the question at issue-and to a record made and
adequate findings executed. 95

D. The Turn of the Judicial Tide
For Babcock and other reformers, the promised land was at hand as
Fasano swept across the land and more than a dozen states embraced its
apparent logic. Florida was not among the Fasanoadherents, and in Florida
Land Co. v. City of Winter Springs,9 6 the Supreme Court of Florida
rejected the argument that an exercise of the police power focused on an
individual parcel of land was not a legislative act.97 Unfortunately, events
conspired against the movement and ultimately, the "revolution," engendered
by Baker and its most famous progeny, Fasano,98 lost its momentum.
With that loss came the demise of the promise of immediate and meaningful
zoning reform.

94. Id.

95. Id at 30.
96. 427 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1983).
97. Id at 174.
98. Fasanowas disapproved by Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722 (Or. 1980),
in which the Oregon Supreme Court held that the substantive criteria for zone changes set
forth in the Fasano opinion "could only apply in addition to, not instead of, other standards
imposed by law." Id. at 727.
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There are almost as many explanations for why the Fasano doctrine
lost its momentum as there are explanations for why the sky is blue. Some
argue that the concept was too threatening to political prerogatives and was
forcibly destroyed by the forces of "evil." Others conclude that the distinct
character of state enabling acts posed an insurmountable obstacle to the
reform movement in many states. Still others believe that the Supreme
Court of the United States' opinion in City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises,Inc.,9 9 was misunderstood and misapplied as a rejection of the
Fasano doctrine.
In Eastlake, a developer challenged a referendum provision which
allowed the zoning of a particular parcel of land to be changed by popular
vote, without regard to procedural niceties or consideration of the merits." 0 The developer argued that the lack of procedural safeguards and
substantive standards to guide the application of the zoning power to a
particular parcel of land violated the property owner's due process rights
under the Constitution of the United States.'
The Supreme Court
rejected the developer's claim, holding that the State of Ohio considered
zoning to be a legislative act'02 and that due process does not attach to
legislative acts. 3 According to the Court, no federally protected rights
were trammeled by the referendum process."
Another popular explanation is that the transformation of local zoning
hearings into formal adjudications was problematic. Local government
officials were not comfortable serving as "trial judges" and wished to avoid
the obvious adversarial nature of formal adjudicatory proceedings. Local
officials were also hesitant to subjugate their political prerogative to respond
to constituent demands by confining their decisions to admissible evidence.
Still others have concluded that the doctrine simply had a bad sense of
timing and was interdicted by another "reform" movement-Monell v.
Department of Social Services."5 What happened, or at least what makes
sense, is that the liability for "improvident land use decisions" movement o° represented by Monell, and the repeated attempts in the 1980s by
the real estate and development industries (the presumed beneficiaries of

99. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
100. Id. at 671.
101. Id. at 676.
102. Id. at 673-74.

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 679.
Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 678-79.
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
The "taking mavens" and their ilk.
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zoning reform) to induce the Supreme Court of the United States to reach
the so-called "taking issue" had the perverse effect of thrashing zoning
reform. City attorney after city attorney argued that it does not make sense
to accede to the notion that zoning is not a legislative act when the
consequence of that cognition is to expose decision-makers to potential
liability.
Whatever the cause, Fasano lost its momentum and property rights
mavens turned their attention to the so-called taking issue in search of a
balance between public and private interests in the use of private property.
Pointing to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' ode to property rights in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, °7 property rights advocates argued that
when a government goes too far in the exercise of its regulatory power, the
government must pay compensation. The advocates' theory was that a
compensation remedy for regulatory excesses would deter governments from
treading on private property rights and realign the balance between public
and private interests in the use of private property. The "police power
hawks" argued, on the other hand, that Justice Holmes' oft-quoted
statement 10 8 was mere metaphorical dictum and that governmental action
which went too far was invalid and did not constitute a taking for public
use. The results of the debate, played out in a series of cases considered by
the Court,1" ultimately favored the compensation advocates. History,
however, does not confirm that the threat of compensation constitutes an
effective governor for regulatory zeal. Indeed, in retrospect, it is possible
to argue that by and large the entire taking issue debate was much ado about
nothing because, as discussed previously, the deferential standard of judicial
review applied to local government zoning decisions renders the question of
available remedies all but a matter of academic curiosity.

107. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
108. "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415.
109. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962);
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927);
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Corp., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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FloridaJoins the Movement

More than a decade after Fasanolost its momentum, and almost twenty
years after Richard F. Babcock's The Zoning Game challenged the legal
fiction of zoning as a legislative act, the Supreme Court of Florida joined
the movement in Board of County Commissioners v. Snyder."' In Snyder,
the court noted: "It is the character of the hearing that determines whether
or not board action is legislative or quasi-judicial. Generally speaking,
legislative action results in the formulation of a general rule of policy,
whereas judicial action results in the application of a general rule of
policy."''
In addition, the supreme court agreed with the court below,
which it quoted as stating:
[R]ezoning actions which have an impact on a limited number of
persons or property owners, on identifiable parties and interests, where
the decision is contingent on a fact or facts arrived at from distinct
alternatives presented at a hearing, and where the decision can be
functionally viewed as policy application, rather than policy setting, are
"'
in the nature of ...quasi-judicial action ....
The Snyders owned a one-half acre parcel of property in unincorporated
Brevard County."' The parcel was designated for residential use under
the 1988 Brevard County Comprehensive Plan Future Land Use Map. The
property was zoned for general use, allowing the construction of a single
family home. The Snyders filed an application to rezone the property to a
zoning classification which allowed a maximum of fifteen units per acre.
At the time, both the current and the requested zoning classifications were
consistent with the residential comprehensive plan designation. The County
staff initially suggested that the application be denied because the property
was located in the one-hundred-year flood plain. The comprehensive plan
allowed only two units per acre to be built in areas within the flood plain,
and thus, the Snyders' requested zoning was inconsistent with the plan.
However, the county director of planning and zoning pointed out that the
property, when developed, would no longer be within the flood plain. The

110.
111.
112.
Ct. App.
113.

627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
Id. at 474 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. (quoting Snyder v. Board of County Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d 65,78 (Fla. 5th Dist.
1991)).
Id. at 471.
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staff then recommended approval of the rezoning and the Snyders' request
was approved by the planning and zoning board." 4
The Snyders' request then went before the Board of County Commissioners for approval. Many citizens opposed the project at the commission
meeting, for the most part, due to the increase in traffic which would be
caused by the development. The county commissioners voted to deny the
requested rezoning, stating no reasons for their denial."'
The Snyders filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court,
which was denied." 6 They then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in
the district court of appeal to review the circuit court's denial of relief,
claiming that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of
law in failing to require the county commission to make findings of
fact.'
The Fifth District Court of Appeal granted the petition for
certiorari, quashed the denial of the petition in the circuit court, and
remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion."'
The County appealed the Fifth District's decision to the Supreme Court
of Florida." 9 The first issue addressed by the court was whether the
nature of the County's action was legislative or quasi-judicial. The nature
of the action determines the level of scrutiny by the court. The court
described the levels of scrutiny as follows:
A board's legislative action is subject to attack in circuit court.
However, in deference to the policy-making function of a board when
acting in a legislative capacity, its actions will be sustained as long as
they are fairly debatable. On the other hand, the rulings of a board
acting in its quasi-judicial capacity are subject to review by certiorari

114. Id.
115. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 471.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 472.
119. The Supreme Court of Florida accepted review of Snyder based on conflict with
Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1959); Palm Beach County v.
Tinnerman, 517 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 528 So. 2d 1183
(Fla. 1988); and City of Jacksonville Beach v. Grubbs, 461 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1984), review denied, 469 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1985). See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 470. The
court stated that Schauer found that the amendment of a zoning ordinance which affected a
large number of persons was an act legislative in nature and that the district courts of appeal
had gone further in Tinnerian and Grubbs, holding that board action on specific rezoning
applications of individual property owners was also legislative. Id. at 474.
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and will be upheld only if they are supported by substantial competent
evidence. 2
It appears that the court recognized a problem with the current standard
of review for zoning amendments but, rather than modify the existing "fairly
debatable" standard of review, the court chose to reach a standard of review
for individual zoning decisions by analyzing the nature of those decisions.
Citing to West FlaglerAmusement Co. v. State Racing Commission,'2' the
court explained:
A judicial or quasi-judicial act determines the rules of law applicable,
and the rights affected by them, in relation to past transactions. On the
other hand, a quasi-legislative or administrative order prescribes what
the rule or requirement of administratively determined duty shall be
with respect to transactions to be executed in the future, in order that
same shall be considered lawful. But even so, quasi-legislative and
quasi-executive orders, after they have already been entered, may have
a quasi-judicial attribute if capable of being arrived at and provided by
law to be declared by the administrative agency only after express
statutory notice, hearing and consideration of evidence to be adduced as
a basis for the making thereof.'
In describing the difference between a quasi-judicial and legislative act, the
court focused on the relation of the governmental decision in time to the
property owners activity and the procedural due process requirements
necessary for the governmental decision."
Applying this criterion, the
court determined that comprehensive rezonings affecting a large portion of
the public are legislative in nature and held that the Board of County
Commissioners' action on the Snyders' petition was a quasi-judicial action
properly reviewable by certiorari. 4
F.

The Problem with Snyder

The difficulty with the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Snyder
is that the court, after arriving at the important way station of recognizing
that individual rezonings are functionally not legislative acts, apparently lost

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474 (citations omitted).
165 So. 64 (Fla. 1935).
Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474 (quoting West Flagler, 165 So. at 65).
Id. at 474.
Id. at 474-75.
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its way in concluding that such actions are in the "nature of a quasi-judicial
[action]. '' 1I5 The court's language, "in the nature of," does not actually
hold that individual rezonings are quasi-judicial. However, if a distinction
was intended, it has been lost in the maelstrom which has followed Snyder.
In truth, individual rezonings have never been "quasi-judicial" actions.
A quasi-judicial proceeding is one in which a decision is based on discrete
standards. In the zoning universe, the variance is a classic example of a
quasi-judicial proceeding where a property owner seeks relief from zoning
requirements on the basis of specific standards such as "undue hardship."
In contrast, rezonings, even individual rezonings, are based on general
standards, such as the goals, policies, and objectives of a comprehensive
plan.
Nor should individual rezonings be quasi-judicial. The reality,
however, is that land use planning is not a precise science which can be
reduced to specific standards because the key factor in land use---compatibility-is governed by the eye of the beholder, the collective judgment of a
democratically elected governing body. 26 Zoning decisions, even individual zoning decisions are by their nature inherently "political," that is, infused
with collective values and directions which are politically derived.
Nonetheless, that is the way it should be, because planning and zoning are
essential political issues at the local government level and go to the very
essence of community.
A fundamental flaw in the leap of faith to "quasi-judicial" is that the
very object of the zoning reformers and the principal value of discarding the
legal fiction that zoning is a legislative act is destroyed. This is so because
quasi-judicial proceedings are apparently deemed reviewable only by
certiorari, a judicial review which is every bit as deferential to local

125. Id. at 474.
126. That "compatibility" is often mere perception is easily illustrated. Consider a 500acre parcel of land slated for development. The developer lays out a network of local streets
and residential lots with a traditional neighborhood shopping area in the center of the project.
The neighborhood shopping center is opened at the same time that the first phase of
residential lots are available for sale and the project builds out quickly. The residents extol
the virtues of their "neighborhood" telling anyone who will listen that the convenience and
safety of "their" neighborhood shopping center is the element which makes their neighborhood a "community of place." Then take the same parcel of land, the same development
plan and make one small change, build the neighborhood shopping center after all of the
homes have been built and sold. Same shopping center, same homes, same neighbors, and
same compatibility, but with a very different result. In this later scenario, the shopping
center is viewed as an alien which will destroy the fabric of their neighborhood and the
residents will fight the development of the center to the finish.
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decision-makers' prerogatives as is the fairly debatable review. 7 After
all, the standard for certiorari review substitutes a search for any justification
(denominated competent substantial evidence) 2 for a search for the
truth.'29 Under the certiorari standard, all a local government need do is
pack the record with unauthenticated documents and "words of rationality"
to survive the limited amount of scrutiny afforded by the competent
substantial evidence standard. The fact is that under the certiorari standard,
the weight of the evidence is irrelevant, leaving local governments just as
free to be arbitrary and capricious as under the fairly debatable rule.
Worse still, certiorari review forces local government officials into a
bizarre netherworld where they serve, at the same time in the same
proceedings, as judges (ruling on questions of evidence and objections),
parties (elected representatives of the people), and jury (impartial decisionmakers), all under the watchful eye of their political constituencies. 3
Under the quasi-judicial paradigm, the city faces a difficult "Catch twentytwo." When an application for a rezoning is submitted, city staff is faced
with the Hobson's choice of taking a position in regard to the zoning-for
or against one of the parties in the adjudication-or running the risk that the
ultimate decision will not be supported by competent substantial evidence.
The only way to resolve the choice without taking sides is for the staff to
remain neutral and ensure that there is sufficient evidence for and against
the proposition to support whatever decision is made.

127. See City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 399 So. 2d 1045, 1046-47 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1981).
128. The Supreme Court of Florida has commented on the scope of certiorari review,
saying:
The circuit court, therefore, transcended the scope of its certiorari review by
substituting its judgment for that of the local zoning authority. Because zoning
or rezoning is the function of the appropriate zoning authority and not the courts,
the circuit court was not empowered to disapprove the finding of the Board
unless the record was devoid of substantial competent evidence to support the
Board's decision.
Skaggs-Albertson's v. ABC Liquors, Inc., 363 So. 2d 1082, 1091 (Fla. 1978) (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added).
129. The very idea that judicial review should be based on a record composed mostly
of unsubstantiated, lay opinion and large doses of political science which was compiled in
front of elected officials with only the faintest attention to the rules of evidence, is
remarkable on its face and ludicrous in practice.
130. The political implications and influences of zoning decisions cannot be overstated,
particularly in communities where local elections are held every two years and public
hearings are available on local access television.
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The simple fact is that the zoning reformers, while advocating more
regular proceedings at the local level, were not seeking to transform the
zoning process into formal adjudicatory proceedings. Rather, they were
advocating that the courts, when reviewing the actions of local government,
should discard the legal fiction that rezonings were "legislative acts" and
afford a more exacting judicial review than the "anything goes" presumption
of legislative validity. In other words, individual rezonings should be
reviewed in the courts, de novo. They should not be reviewed under the
"anything goes," fairly debatable standard, but rather, under a more exacting
standard which could be called something like the "rational justification
rule."
Under the "rational justification rule," a court would hold a de novo
proceeding, attended by the rules of evidence, to determine whether a
particular rezoning action "bears a substantial relationship to the public
health, safety, and welfare." In the absence of any evidence that the action
is not sufficiently related to the public welfare, the court would defer to the
local government. In other words, a plaintiff would have the burden of
proof to demonstrate that the challenged action did not bear the requisite
relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare; or to put it another
way, that the regulation exceeds the bounds of necessity.13 ' If the plaintiff
makes this initial showing, the burden of proof would shift to the local
government to demonstrate that the action at issue does in fact bear some
substantial relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare. After
hearing all of the evidence, the court would then rule based on the manifest
weight of the evidence. If the local government succeeds in demonstrating
by the manifest weight of the evidence that the action in fact bears "some
substantial relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare," then the
local government's action would be sustained.
V. CONCLUSION
Effective judicial review is the foundation of any civilized system of
rights. For too many years, planning and zoning regulations have been
immunized from judicial scrutiny. As a result, local government planning
and zoning has become adversarial and divisive. Worse still, property
owners and developers have turned to the legislature to limit the planning
and zoning powers of the government. In Florida, the legislature has acted
by creating a law which is very likely to further muddy the already dark

131. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Burritt v. Harris, 172 So.
2d 820 (Fla. 1965).
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waters of planning jurisprudence. More laws and more standards are not
needed. What is needed is an effective means of enforcing those laws that
already exist. When, and if, the traditional substantive due process standard
in Florida-the "bounds of necessity" standard, as articulated in Burritt v.
Harris-isfreed from the "anything goes" application of the fairly debatable
rule, the "rational justification" standard or the "substantially advances
taking" standard can become the norm of judicial review in Florida. Then
the power and resources needed for effective planning and zoning will be
secure and available. In contrast, if effective and meaningful judicial relief
continues to be illusory in Florida, the march of property rights legislation
will continue, and ultimately, the system will fail. Two decades of planning
preoccupation with "legal defensibility" has set the "default switch" against
enlightened resource planning and management. Something has to give or
there will be more Bert K. Harris 32 acts and more decisions in the vein
of First English, Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan.

132. See FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (1995).
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